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I. INTRODUCTION
This country has long recognized the necessity of an education
in order to function productively in society. As suggested by one of
the founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, "some degree of education is
necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelli-
gently in our open political system."1 More recently, the Supreme
Court recognized the importance of education in Brown v. Board of
Education:2 "[I]t is doubtful that any child may reasonably be ex-
pected to succeed in life if he [or she] is denied the opportunity of an
education."3 The Court reiterated its belief in Plyler v. Doe:4 "[B]y
depriving the children of any disfavored group of an education, we
1. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (accepting the proposition that
education prepares individuals to be self-sufficient members of society).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
3. Id. at 493.
4. 457 U.S. 202, 202 (1982).
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foreclose the means by which that group might raise the level of es-
teem in which it is held by the majority .... Illiteracy is an enduring
disability."5
Today this need to educate remains just as pressing. Our
country is plagued by economic and social costs because of its failure
to provide this "basic tool."6 Without an education, adults are unable
to provide for themselves financially, much less for their families. 7 As
a result, many turn to crime.8 Theft, drugs, and violence become the
solution, and society is left the victim of the very problem it helped to
create. 9
This Note focuses on children with mental impairments0 and
the public school system's current attempts to meet their needs.
Historically, despite the American judicial system's recognition of the
importance of education," children with disabilities were routinely
denied the benefits of the free public education the Court required for
children of all races in Brown." This denial took two forms. The first
5. Id. at 222.
6. Anthony H. Mansfield, Juvenile Justice Gone Awry: Expulsion Statutes Unjustly Deny
Educational Rights to Students, 1 N.Y. City L. Rev. 203, 220 (1996).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 218, 221.
9. Id.
10. Society can begin to recognize individuals with disabilities as unique human beings by
not referring to them as the "retarded" or the "disabled." Congress made a major step toward
this goal in 1990 when it changed the name of the legislation on which this Note focuses from
the Education of the Handicapped Act to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 104-476, § 901(a), 104 Stat.
1103, 1141-42 (1990), codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1994 ed.)
11. See West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (noting the
"important functions" of boards of education in "educating the young for citizenship" but striking
down a West Virginia law requiring public school students to salute the American flag on first
amendment grounds); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing that
private primary schools in Oregon were regarded as "useful and meritorious"; recognizing that
states may not force students to attend only public schools and that parents have a fundamental
liberty interest in directing the education of their children); Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 400-01 (1923) (stating that education is "useful and honorable, essential, indeed, to the
public welfare").
12. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (describing the importance of equal public school educa-
tion for all children). In the findings of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20
U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., Congress noted that, as of 1975:
(1) there are more than eight million children with disabilities in the United States
today;
(2) the special education needs of such children are not being fully met;
(3) more than half of the children with disabilities in the United States do not receive
appropriate educational services which would enable them to have full equality of oppor-
tunity;
(4) one million of the children with disabilities in the United States are excluded en-
tirely from the public school system and will not go through the educational process with
their peers;
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was outright exclusion of children with mental impairments from
public schools, 13 and the second was more subtle, lying in the system's
tendency to see only the impairment, not the unique individual.14
Children's advocates began responding to these injustices in
the 1960s and early 1970s, relying on the strong language in Brown to
argue that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
protects not only children of different races, but also children with
disabilities: "Such an [educational] opportunity, where the state has
undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to
all on equal terms."'15 The fruits of these advocates' labor were real-
ized in two federal court cases in 1972.
In Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v.
Commmonwealth of Pennsylvania ("PARC'),16 the court analyzed sev-
eral Pennsylvania statutes that went beyond the subtle form of exclu-
sion. The statutes permitted school directors to reject students who
did not have the mental capacity of a typical five-year-old, and the
laws permitted the State Board of Education to exclude "uneducable
and untrainable" children from the public schools.17 These statutes
prevented some 70,000 to 80,000 children with mental impairments
(5) there are many children with disabilities throughout the United States participat-
ing in regular school programs whose disabilities prevent them from having a successful
educational experience because their disabilities are undetected; [and]
(6) because of the lack of adequate services within the public school system, families
are often forced to find services outside the public school system, often at great distance
from their residence and at their own expense.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(b).
13. For example, a 1958 Illinois Supreme Court decision held that Illinois's compulsory
education statute did not require the state to provide a free public education to children with
mental impairments. See Department of Pub. Welfare v. Haas, 15 Ill. 2d 204, 154 N.E.2d 265,
270 (1958) (holding that, while the Illinois Constitution requires Illinois to provide public
education, it does not require Illinois to provide public education to the "feeble minded or
mentally deficient" who cannot "receive a good common school education"). See also State ex rel.
Beattie v. Board of Educ. of City of Antigo, 169 Wis. 231, 172 N.W. 153, 154 (1919) (discussing
the exclusion of "a crippled and defective child.., since birth" due to the fact that he had "a
depressing and nauseating effect upon the teachers and school children," which "distract[ed] the
attention of other pupils, and interfere[d] generally with the discipline and progress of the
schoor').
14. Senator Robert T. Stafford outlined this tendency: "[T]he more subtle and perhaps
more destructive invisibility of being in fact 'seen,' but 'seen' by an inner eye that perceives a
label rather than a unique person. An eye which does not see Johnny or Susie, but instead, sees
'crippled,' or 'retarded,' or 'maladjusted.'" Robert T. Stafford, Education for the Handicapped: A
Senator's Perspective, 3 Vt. L. Rev. 71, 72 (1978).
15. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).
16. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
17. Id. at 282 nn.3-4.
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from receiving a public education.ls A group of parents of children
labeled "mentally-retarded" brought a class action lawsuit challenging
the legislation. 19 A three-judge panel noted that the statutes pre-
sented serious constitutional issues 20 concerning the children's due
process 21 and equal protection rights.22  In reaching this conclusion,
the court took particular offense at the labeling of certain children as
uneducable, noting "expert opinion" had indicated that "a mentally
retarded person can benefit at any point in his life and development
from a program of education."23 The court recognized that the broad
language in Brown extended beyond the race issue to include children
with mental infirmities. PARC resulted in a consent agreement
whereby mentally impaired children were guaranteed "access to a free
public program of education and training appropriate to [their indi-
vidual] capacities, 24 with the training to take place in a regular class-
room if possible.25  Finally, a stipulation accompanying the consent
agreement gave parents an active role in planning educational pro-
grams for children with disabilities. As a result of this stipulation,
parents were entitled to mandatory notice of any changes in the
child's education plan, an opportunity to appeal, and access to the
child's records.26
That same year, in Mills v. Board of Education of District of
Columbia,27 another federal court went a step further by explicitly
18. Id. at 296. The court noted that the children "were denied access to any public educa-
tion services in schools, home or day care or other community facilities, or state residential
institutions." Id. (emphasis omitted).
19. Id. at 281-82.
20. Since the parties agreed to enter into a final consent decree, the court did not reach
conclusions on these issues, but it did state that the plaintiffs had presented colorable
constitutional claims, which gave rise to federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 295-97.
21. The court recognized that the possibility of misdiagnosis or placement in an overly
restrictive environment, coupled with attendant stigmatization, gave rise to a "colorable claim"
that the Due Process Clause required notice and a hearing before schools could label a child
"mentally retarded." Id. at 293-95. In addition, the court noted that the denial of notice and a
hearing for aggrieved parents of children excluded from school might violate the parents'
procedural due process rights. Id. at 293.
22. Id. at 295-97. The court concluded that the plaintiffs established a "colorable claim"
under the Equal Protection Clause, stating that "the evidence raises serious doubts... as to the
existence of a rational basis" for denying educational benefits from the plaintiffs. Id. at 297
23. Id. at 296 (quoting the consent agreement entered into by the parties).
24. Id. at 314.
25. "[P]lacement in a regular public school class is preferable to placement in a special
public school class and placement in a special public school class is preferable to placement in
any other type of program of education and training." Id. at 307. This philosophy has come to
be known as mainstreaming and, as will be seen through later discussion, has become one of the
most controversial issues in educating those with mental impairments. See Part III.B.2.b.
26. PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 303-05.
27. 348 F. Supp. 866, 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
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holding that a statute similar to the one addressed in PARC was un-
constitutional. 8 The statute challenged in Mills allowed the Board of
Education to "excuse" a child from mandatory school attendance if the
child was "unable mentally or physically to profit from attendance at
school."29 The Mills court held that the District of Columbia statute
governing education of children with mental impairments violated
constitutional due process and equal protection rights.30 In addition,
the Mills court held that the cost of educating children with disabili-
ties should not undermine its overriding importance. 31
Both the Mills and PARC decisions were ostensibly based on
due process and equal protection concerns, but both also relied on the
Brown Court's emphasis on the inherent importance of education.3 2
The Brown language, as well as the Mills and PARC decisions, moti-
vated Congress to enact the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act ("EHA") in 1975, renamed the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA") in 1990.33  Quoting Brown, the Senate
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare stated that the Supreme
Court had established the principle that an "[educational] opportu-
nity ... is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms."34 The Committee continued to emphasize the importance of
educational opportunities, not only for disabled children, but also for
society as a whole, in setting forth what should be viewed as the sub-
stantive goal of the IDEA. The committee explained:
[P]ublic agencies and taxpayers will spend billions of dollars over the lifetimes
of these individuals to maintain such persons as dependents and in a mini-
mally acceptable lifestyle. With proper education services, many would be able
to become productive citizens, contributing to society instead of being forced to
28. Id. at 875-77. The plaintiffs in Mills were seven children, represented by their next
friends, with various disabilities, including mental impairments, behavioral and emotional
disorders, and hyperactivity. Id. at 868.
29. Id. at 874 (quoting D.C. Code § 21-203 (1967)).
30. Id. at 875.
31. Id. at 876 ([Tihe District of Columbia's interest in educating the excluded children
clearly must outweigh its interest in preserving its financial resources.").
32. See id. at 874-75 (concluding that denying children with disabilities an equal, public
education violated their due process rights and citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493); PARC, 343 F.
Supp. at 297 (finding "colorable claims" of due process and equal protection violations).
33. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
34. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, S. Rep. No. 94-168, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 6 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A-N. 1425, 1430 (quoting Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
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remain burdens. Others, through such services, would increase their inde-
pendence, thus reducing their dependence on society.
35
The ninety-third Congress thus passed the IDEA with the intent to
provide equality and self-sufficiency to children with disabilities.36
The question this Note addresses is whether the courts have stayed
true to this original intent, particularly as it pertains to children with
mental impairments.
Although the IDEA includes many types of disabilities, 7 this
Note focuses on two: "mental retardation" and "serious emotional
disturbance." Part II outlines the technical definitions of these two
types of disabilities and discusses their differences. It also explains
the program the IDEA uses to provide for these two unique disabili-
ties under one statutory heading. Part III gives a nondetailed expla-
nation of the mechanics of the IDEA and the benefits it attempts to
provide, focusing on the concept of Free Appropriate Public Education
35. S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 9 (cited in note 34) (echoing the language from Brown, 347 U.S.
at 493, with which this Note began). The PARC decision also emphasized the societal impor-
tance of educational opportunities for disabled children:
The Presidents Committee on Mental Retardation in its 1969 Annual Report... esti-
mates that "[s]ome three-quarters of this nation's retarded people could become self-
supporting if given the right kind of training early enough. Another 10 to 15 percent
could become partially self-supporting." Dr. Aubrey J. Yates ... states that "'[t]wo-
thirds and probably four-fifths of those who might on I.Q. [score] be classified as feeble
minded can live in financial and social independence under present economic circum-
stances.'"
PARC, 343 F. Supp. at 296 n.50 (citations omitted) (quoting President's Committee on Mental
Retardation, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Annual Report of the
President's Committee on Mental Retardation 17 (U.S. G.P.O., 1969); Aubrey J. Yates, Behavior
Therapy 339 (John Wiley & Sons, 1970)).
36. For a more detailed description of the history behind the IDEA, see Daniel H. Melvin
H, Comment, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DePaul L. Rev. 599, 608-18
(1995) (detailing, in addition to the legislative history of the IDEA, the history of de jure exclu-
sion of children with disabilities, early legislation to aid disabled children, constitutional theo-
ries regarding rights of disabled children, and congressional recognition of the civil rights of the
disabled through the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). See also Rebecca Weber Goldman, Comment,
A Free Appropriate Education in the Least Restrictive Environment: Promises Made, Promises
Broken by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. 243, 246-53
(1994) (discussing judicial and legislative landmarks that led to the enactment of the IDEA).
The Act itself implements essentially a "carrot and stick" approach to accomplishing its goals.
In short, the statute "provides federal funds to assist state and local agencies in educating
children with disabilities, but conditions such funding on compliance with certain goals and
procedures." Ojai Unified School Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th Cir. 1993).
37. The Act defines the term "children with disabilities" to mean "children... with mental
retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or language impairments, visual
impairments including blindness, serious emotional disturbance, orthopedic impairments,
autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or specific learning
disabilities... who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. §
1401(a)(1)(A).
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("FAPE"). It seeks to define "appropriate education"38 and "special
education and related services," 39 two benefits specifically required by
the IDEA. Part IV explores the special topic of discipline under the
IDEA, an issue that presents serious problems for all children with
disabilities. This section briefly analyzes a recently proposed
amendment to the statute addressing disciplinary concerns.
This Note concludes that the substantive goal of the IDEA
should be to enable each child to become self-sufficient. Only by ad-
dressing the unique needs of children with disabilities will this goal of
independence, the true purpose of an educational system, be met.
II. THE IDEA AND CHILDREN WITH MENTAL IMPAIRMENTS: DEFINING
DISABILITY AND SERVING INDIVIDUAL NEEDS
As explained above, this Note focuses on two of the disabilities
listed in the IDEA: "mental retardation" and "serious emotional dis-
turbance."4 The Code of Federal Regulations defines "mental retar-
dation" as "significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and mani-
fested during the developmental period that adversely affects a child's
educational performance."41 This combination of both low intellectual
functioning and poor adaptive behavior indicates the severity of this
disability.42 As a result, a child suffering from mental retardation will
often have drastically different educational goals from those of a child
without such a severe disability. For example, a child with mental
38. See Part IU.A.
39. See Part III.B.
40. The Act recognizes three other mental disabilities. The first is "specific learning
disability," described in the Code of Federal Regulations as "a disorder in one or more of the
basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or
written." 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(10) (1996). The term is limited to such conditions as "minimal
brain disfunction" and "dyslexia." Id. Since the term does not apply to children suffering from
"mental retardation" or "emotional disturbances," it will not be a focus here. See id. (specifically
excluding these disabilities). The second is "traumatic brain injury," which refers to "an
acquired injury to the brain caused by an external physical force." Id. § 300.7(b)(12). The third
is autism, which is defined as "a developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and
nonverbal communication and social interaction, generally evident before age 3, that adversely
affects a child's educational performance." Id. § 300.7(b)(1).
41. Id. § 300.7(b)(5).
42. Low intellectual functioning is drastically different from low academic performance.
For example, a child who performs below average academically may have the ability to perform
at grade level. By contrast, a child with low intellectual abilities may be limited to the point
that performing at grade level would never be a possibility.
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retardation might be seeking to attain skills "such as using money,
taking public transportation, and developing personal hygiene skills"
instead of seeking to master more traditional classroom topics. 43
A "serious emotional disturbance," on the other hand, lacks the
severity of mental retardation; "subaverage intellectual functioning"
is not a part of its definition. The term "serious emotional distur-
bance" indicates emotional problems that may or may not result in
poor academic performance. Any sub-average academic performance,
however, would not be the result of low intellectual functioning.44
Unfortunately, school districts have shown an inability to deal effec-
tively with children with serious emotional disturbances. The most
common short comings have been placing such children in too restric-
tive a setting, failing to provide them with adequate assistance, or
failing to identify the children as having a disability.45 In fact, a 1990
43. Theresa Glennon, Disabling Ambiguities: Confronting Barriers to the Education of
Students with Emotional Disabilities, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. 295, 301 (1993).
44. The Code of Federal Regulations recognizes the following as characteristics that might
indicate a severe emotional disturbance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual, sensory, or health
factors;
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal relationships with
peers and teachers;
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances;
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression; or
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or
school problems.
34 C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9)(A)-(E).
45. See Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 302-03 (cited in note 43) (describing three central
deficiencies in the education of children with emotional disabilities: "(1) failure to identify many
of the seriously emotionally disturbed children of school age; (2) failure to provide effective
programs to those students who are identified as needing special education; and (3) frequent use
of overly restrictive settings for children, including residential schools isolated from the stu.
dents' communities"). Professor Glennon explains:
The school lives of children with emotional disabilities are often marked by confu-
sion, disjuncture, change, and rejection. These children are passed from one teacher
and administrator to another, sent home for discipline, or shipped away to a residential
school or hospital following a crisis. At these transition points, children may lose impor-
tant instructional time. Even worse, these children receive repeated messages from the
educational system that they are not wanted. Perceiving their school careers as fail-
ures, many children with emotional disabilities drop out. Stories of discontinuity and
failure are familiar and depressing to these children and their parents, as well as to
school personnel and student advocates.
Id. at 295.
Glennon also recognizes that "Congress found in 1990 that 'children with serious emotional
disturbance remain the most underserved population of students with disabilities.'" Id. at 303
(quoting Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-544, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1761).
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federal government report estimated that educational systems served
only nineteen percent of students with serious emotional disabilities. 46
The obvious question is how the IDEA attempts to provide for
children that have such radically different disabilities as "mental
retardation" and "severe emotional disturbance." The IDEA attempts
to provide for children with varying degrees of disability through each
child's Individualized Education Program ("IEP").47 The IEP is a writ-
ten document that serves as the baseline mechanism of the IDEA. It
establishes a specific child's educational program. 48 As described by
the Ninth Circuit, the IEP is "the substantive procedure" that
"ensures that the child's education is tailored to [his or] her individual
46. Id. at 304 (citing Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, H.R. Rep.
No. 101-544, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1723, 1762). Regulations
attempt to limit the number of children classified as having a "serious emotional disturbance" to
some degree by stating that "socially maladjusted" children do not fall within the definition. 34
C.F.R. § 300.7(b)(9)(ii). However, this limitation is immediately followed by an exception:
"unless it is determined that they have a serious emotional disturbance." Id. In spite of this
circular exception, school districts continue to recognize this limitation so that their ability to
take disciplinary action against a problem child will not be diminished. As Professor Glennon
has noted:
Officials, however, may be reluctant to identify those aggressive students [who are suf-
fering from an emotional disturbance], especially adolescents, in order to avoid the loss
of disciplinary authority. As currently written, the regulations provide some constraints
on school decisions, but they do not eliminate the school's significant de facto discretion-
ary authority to exclude students from the Aces benefits.
Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 335 n.209 (cited in note 43) (citing Jane Knitzer, Zina Steinberg,
and Brahm Fleisch, At the Schoolhouse Door: An Examination of Programs and Policies for
Children with Behavioral and Emotional Problems 9 (Bank Street College of Education, 1990)).
47. The IDEA defines an "individualized education program" as "a written statement for
each child with a disability developed in any meeting by a representative of the local educa-
tional agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or supervise
the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of children with
disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(20). The statement must include:
(1) information on the child's current level of functioning or performance; (2) long-term
(typically one school year) goals and short-term objectives that address the child's needs;
(3) the specific support services provided to the child; (4) the level of participation in
regular education; (5) the starting date and duration of services; and (6) objective crite-
ria and evaluation procedures for measuring achievement of the goals and objectives.
Goldman, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 278 (cited in note 36). See generally Barbara D. Bateman,
Better IEPs: How to Develop Legally Correct and Educationally Useful Programs 3-13 (Sopris
West, 2d ed. 1996).
48. Senator Stafford, one of the major sponsors of the 1975 Act, described the importance
of the IEP in the following manner: "We in Congress did not attempt to define 'appropriate' in
the law but instead, we established a base-line mechanism, a written document called the
Individualized Education Program (IEP)." Stafford, 3 Vt. L. Rev. at 75 (cited in note 14). See
also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988) (describing the IEP as "the centerpiece of [the
IDEA's] education delivery system"); 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(b)(1) ("An IEP must [b]e in effect
before special education and related services are provided to a child ....").
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needs."49 The problem, however, is uncertainty regarding the IEP's
objectives, largely because of Congress's lack of explicit substantive
goals.50 Self-sufficiency, for example, was discussed in the legislative
history, yet ignored in the IDEA itself.51 The task of determining the
IEP's goals has been left to the courts, resulting in many children
receiving inadequate educations.52
III. IDEA BENEFITS
When deciding what benefits the IDEA guarantees children
with disabilities, the courts have attempted to glean substance from
what is essentially a procedural statute. The central feature of the
statute is the assurance "that all children with disabilities have avail-
able to them.., a free appropriate public education which empha-
sizes special education and related services designed to meet their
49. County of San Diego v. California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1461
(9th Cir. 1996) (citing Sacremento City Unified Sch. Dist., Bd. of Educ. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d
1398, 1400 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994)).
50. "Noticeably absent from the language of the statute is any substantive standard pre-
scribing the level of education to be accorded handicapped children." Board of Educ., Hendrick
Hudson Central School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 (1982). Some states, however, do in-
clude a substantive standard in their state version of the IDEA. The federal statute merely sets
a minimum standard, for which Rowley provides the interpretation. A state statute may go
beyond the federal standard. See Eileen 0. Ordover and Kathleen B. Boundy, Educational
Rights of Children with Disabilities 10-11 (Center for Law and Education, 1991) (noting that
states may set higher quality and benefit standards). For example, Massachusetts requires that
educational services designed for a child with disabilities must benefit that child "to the maxi-
mum extent feasible." Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 71B § 3 (West, 1996 ed.). In addition, § 504 of
the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394, codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794a (1994 ed.), does include substantive standards. An "appropriate
education" is defined for purposes of § 504 to be regular or special education and related aids
and services "designed to meet individual educational needs of handicapped persons as ade-
quately as the needs of nonhandicapped persons are met." Ordover and Boundy, Educational
Rights at 11 (cited in this note) (citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1)(i) (1996)).
51. See note 35 and accompanying text.
52. The failures in dealing with children suffering from emotional disturbances have been
documented extensively. See Richard S. Neel, et al., What Happens After Special Education A
Statewide Follow-up Study of Secondary Students Who Have Behavioral Disorders, 13 Behav.
Disorders 209, 213 (1988) (noting approximately one-third of emotionally disturbed students
surveyed after the end of their education were unemployed); Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 334
(cited in note 43) (noting that approximately 28% to 36% of incarcerated juveniles have an
emotional disability) (citing Peter E. Leone, Beyond Fixing Bad Behavior and Bad Boys:
Multiple Perspectives on Education and Treatment of Troubled and Troubling Youth, 1989
Severe Behav. Disorders Monograph 1, 4). See also Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 296 (cited in
note 43) (stating that, in order for children with disabilities to learn necessary and emotional
skills, educators should "redefine the content and focus of education for this group of children
and determine which array of services will support their educational endeavors"). See generally
Alex J. Hurder, The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Right to Learn, 24
Hum. Res. 16, 16-17 (Winter 1997) (discussing the appropriate educational goals for children
with disabilities).
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unique needs."53  Initially, this Part will examine how courts have
defined a "free appropriate public education" ("FAPE")s4 and discuss
the level of education children with mental impairements receive. It
will then discuss more specifically the "special education" and "related
services" that constitute this "appropriate" education.
A. Free Appropriate Public Education
1. Board of Education, Hendrick Hudson Central
School District v. Rowley
The Supreme Court established the standard of education
required for students with disabilities in Board of Education,
Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley 55 Although the
case did not address the situation of a child with mental retardation
or serious emotional disturbance, courts have recognized it to be the
preeminent authority in interpreting IDEA standards.56 Indeed,
Rowley is the only Supreme Court decision defining IDEA substantive
standards.
53. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
54. Federal Regulations define FAPE as follows:
[The term "free appropriate public education" means special education and related
services that-
(a) Are provided at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge;
(b) Meet the standards of the SEA [State Educational Agency], including the
requirements of this part;
(c) Include preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the
State involved; and
(d) Are provided in conformity with an IEP that meets the requirements of §§
300.340-300.350.
34 C.F.R. § 300.8. See Ordover and Boundy, Educational Rights at 10 (cited in note 50)
(defining the components of FAPE as "special education and related services meeting state and
IDEA standards provided at public expense, with no cost to parent or child, under public
supervision, in conformity with the child's IEP" and citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(18)).
55. 458 U.S. 176, 187-204 (1982).
56. See, for example, M.C. on Behalf of J.C. v. Central Regional School Dist., 81 F.3d 389,
393 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 176, 136 L. Ed. 2d 116 (1996) (considering Rowley to
be "the principal authority establishing the standard of education services required under
IDEA"). The 1982 Rowley decision is the sole opinion the Supreme Court has set forth
concerning the standard of education required for students with disabilities under the IDEA.
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Amy Rowley, a child with deafness, was an elementary school
student with an J.Q of 122.57 Amy attended kindergarten in a regular
classroom for kindergarten and had been provided with an FM hear-
ing aid that amplified teachers' and fellow students' words into a
wireless receiver.5 8 Amy's parents were dissatisfied with this ar-
rangement because the hearing aid only allowed Amy to identify fifty-
nine percent of the words spoken to her.59 The parents requested that
Amy be provided with a sign language interpreter, which would have
enabled her to identify all of the words spoken in class.60 The school
denied the parents' request. Because Amy was achieving educational,
academic, and social success without an interpreter, an independent
examiner, in a separate hearing, agreed that an interpreter was not
necessary.61  After appealing to the State Commissioner of
Education,6 2 the Rowleys filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, claiming that denial of their
request constituted a violation of Amy's right to free appropriate
public education as guaranteed by the IDEA.63
Responding to the lack of any substantive guidelines in the
IDEA,64 the district court in Rowley entertained several possible
interpretations of FAPE. First, the court stated that an "adequate
education" could be defined as "an education substantial enough to
facilitate a child's progress from one grade to another and to enable
him or her to earn a high school diploma." 65 The court then stated
57. Rowley v. Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist., Westchester County Bd. of Educ., 483
F. Supp. 528, 528-29, 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 632 F.2d 945, 955 (2d Cir. 1980), rev'd and re-
manded, 458 U.S. 176, 210 (1982).
58. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 184.
59. See Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 531-32 (assessing Amy's ability to discern words with and
without various aids and stating that Amy's parents insisted that a sign language interpreter be
provided in all of Amy's academic classes).
60. See id. at 530, 532 (finding that Amy could identify all words spoken to her when "total
communication," a method combining sign language with other communicative tools such as
mouthing, amplifications, and visual clues, was employed).
61. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.506(a) ("A parent or a public educational
agency may initiate a hearing on any of the matters described in § 300.504(a)(1) and (2)."). See
also Ordover and Boundy, Educational Rights at 54-56 (cited in note 50) (describing procedures
for appealing school decisions).
62. On appeal, the New York Commissioner of Education affirmed the examiner's deci-
sion. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(a) ("If the hearing is conducted by a
public agency other than the SEA [State Educational Agency], any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision in the hearing may appeal to the SEA.").
63. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.511 ('Any party aggrieved by the find-
ings and decision made in a hearing who does not have the right to appeal under § 300.510, and
any party aggrieved by the decision of a reviewing officer under § 300.510, has the right to bring
a civil action under section 615(e)(2) of the Act.").
64. See note 51 and accompanying text.
65. Rowley, 483 F. Supp at 534.
726 [Vol. 50:715
1997] THE IDEA AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY 727
that an "appropriate education" could also be one that "enables the
handicapped child to achieve his or her full potential. '6
Ultimately, the district court struck a middle ground: the
interpretation endorsed by the district court would require that "each
handicapped child be given an opportunity to achieve his [or her] full
potential commensurate with the opportunity provided to other
children. 67 The court found this third standard to be most consistent
with the federal regulations, with the equal protection decisions that
had motivated Congress to pass the IDEA,68 and with "common
sense."69 Using this interpretation of FAPE, the court held that Amy,
without the aid of an interpreter, was not being provided the opportu-
nity to reach a level of potential proportionate to that of her non-
handicapped classmates. 70 A divided panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed this decision, 71 and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.72
Although the Supreme Court agreed with the district court's
view that the Act lacked an explicit substantive definition of FAPE, 73
it found that the components of FAPE outlined in the Act provided
sufficient guidance to school officials. 74 The Court thus established a
66. Id.
67. Id. The court clarified that such a standard "requires that the potential of the handi-
capped child be measured and compared to his or her performance, and that the resulting
differential or 'shortfall' be compared to the shortfall experienced by non-handicapped children."
Id.
68. See notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
69. Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 534.
70. Id. at 535. This conclusion was based largely on the fact that, with merely the hearing
aid, Amy "underst[ood] considerably less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not
deaf." Id. at 532.
71. Rowley v. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson School Dist., 632 F.2d 945, 955 (2d Cir.
1980), rev'd and remanded, 458 U.S. 176, 210 (1982). Many reacted quite harshly to this deci-
sion. The New York Times criticized the decision in an editorial:
It is only right to remedy a pattern of neglect. But it is perverse for Congress and
the courts to define an "appropriate" education only for the handicapped and to write
rules that result in the deprivation of other children. The allocation of scarce local re-
sources is necessarily a political matter, best left to local government .... It is no favor
to the handicapped to make them the beneficiaries of unique rhetorical rights and the
object of local resentment.
Going Wrong with Handicapped Rights, N.Y. Times 16 (July 19, 1980).
72. Board of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson School Dist. v. Rowley, 454 U.S. 961 (1981)
(granting certiorari).
73. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 187-88.
74. Id. at 189. The Court, quoting the EHA, described the components as follows: "[A)
'free appropriate education' consists of educational instruction specifically designed to meet the
unique needs of the handicapped child, supported by such services as are necessary to permit
the child 'to benefit' from the instruction." Id. at 188-89. Specifically, the Court stated that "if
personalized instruction is being provided with sufficient supportive services to permit the child
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dual-pronged inquiry to determine whether the IDEA had been vio-
lated.75 Under this inquiry, a court must first decide whether the
State complied with the procedures set forth in the Act.76 If so, the
court must determine whether the individualized educational pro-
gram developed through the Act's procedures was "reasonably calcu-
lated to enable the child to receive educational benefits.."77
Essentially, the Court appeared to require no more than that the
schol "confer some educational benefit upon the ... child."78 Applying
this standard, the Court denied the Rowleys' request for a sign
language interpreter,79 finding that all procedures had been properly
followed and that Amy was obviously receiving educational benefits.
The Court found these benefits to be evidenced by the fact that Amy
was performing better than the average student in her class and
easily progressing from grade to grade.80
The Rowley dissent attacked the Court's benefit standard by
suggesting it could be satisfied if the school system merely provided
Amy Rowley with "a teacher with a loud voice, for she would benefit
from that service."81 The dissent also predicted that the Court's hold-
ing would bar any challenge to an IEP due to the the majority's strong
deference to correctly followed procedure.8 2 Unfortunately, some later
decisions have proven the accuracy of these predictions. 83
2. Application of the Rowley Standard
Although the Supreme Court has ruled on IDEA standards,
confusion and uncertainty still surround the substantive require-
ments of IDEA. The main reason for this confusion is the limited
scope of Rowley. Amy Rowley had an I.Q. of 122 and was easily ad-
vancing from grade to grade.84 Presumably in an effort to avoid set-
to benefit from the instruction, and the other items on the definitional checklist are satisfied,
the child is receiving a 'fTree appropriate public education' as defined by the Act." Id. at 189.
75. Id. at 206.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 206-08.
78. Id. at 200.
79. Id. at 210.
80. Id. at 209-10.
81. Id. at 215 (White, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 216-18 (White, J., dissenting).
83. See, for example, Carlisle Area School v. Scott P. by and through Bess P., 62 F.3d 520,
533-34 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1419, 134 L. Ed. 2d 544 (1996) (stating that school
districts "need -not provide the optimal level of services, or even a level that would confer
additional benefits, since the IEP required by IDEA represents only a 'basic floor of
opportunity'" and citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201).
84. See notes 57, 80 and accompanying text.
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ting a standard that would require school districts to maximize stu-
dents' potential,85 the Court articulated the Rowley "some educational
benefit" standard. 6  This standard was easily applied in the Rowley
case because grade advancement is a clearly measurable benefit87
However, the standard is difficult to apply in cases where children are
attempting to learn basic life skills or are trying to overcome an emo-
tional disturbance. In fact, the Rowley standard provides nothing but
confusion when courts attempt to apply it to benefits outside the
scope of pre-established educational criteria such as grade promotion.
Two recent cases, one dealing with a child with "mental retardation"
and one in which a child suffered from a "serious emotional distur-
bance," demonstrate this difficultys 8
In M.C. on Behalf of J.C. v. Central Regional School District
("M.C."),9 the parents of a sixteen-year-old boy named J.C. who was
severely mentally retarded sought to have their son placed in a
residential school.90 A central issue before the court was whether the
placement in day school met FAPE requirements.9' At the
administrative hearing, an administrative law judge found that J.C.'s
schooling provided him with some educational benefit due to slight
improvement "at times" in his ability to perform basic functions, thus
85. See Goldman, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 258 n.141 (cited in note 36) ("Commentators
have argued that cost considerations motivated the Courts use of the minimal benefit stan-
dard."); Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of The Handicapped Act: A Study
in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 349, 374 (1990) ('The Aces
promise of lavish services for handicapped children was now a grudgingly borne obligation to do
the minimum necessary."); Patricia L. Arcuri, Comment, Statutory Mandate for 'Free
Appropriate Public Education" Satisfied When Handicapped Benefit From Specialized
Instruction and Support Services, 14 Rutgers L. J. 989, 1004-05 (1983) (concluding that cost
considerations motivated the minimal benefit standard); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, Board of
Education of Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley: Utter Chaos, 12 J. L. & Educ.
235, 235 (1983) (asserting that cost was the "obvious rationale for the Court's blatant disregard
of Congressional intent").
86. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
87. The Court was convinced that Amy was benefiting since she was advancing from grade
to grade. See note 80 and accompanying text.
88. See M.C., 81 F.3d at 393 (adjudicating the claims of parents of a child with "severe
mental retarda[tion]" who challenged their child's IEP); County of San Diego v. California
Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d at 1461-62 (addressing a California county's challenge to
the state's classification of a student as "seriously emotionally disturbed").
89. 81 F.3d 389, 391-92 (3d Cir. 1996).
90. Id. at 393. They challenged his day placement, seeking a residential placement in-
stead. Id. Although placement decisions will be discussed in depth later in this Note, see Part
llI.B.2, it is important to note that under the IDEA, a child may receive any of a variety of
placements. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (a)(16) (including instruction conducted in classrooms, homes,
hospitals and institutions in the definition of "special education"). Indeed, it is this issue of
placement, in one form or another, that generates the vast majority of IDEA caselaw.
91. M.C., 81 F.3d at 394.
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satisfying the Rowley requirement.9 2 The district court disagreed,
finding that "an appropriate IEP must result in more than de minimis
benefits to satisfy Rowley's 'some educational benefit' standard."93
Referring to a previous Third Circuit opinion, the district court
clarified that "a plan for a severely handicapped student will satisfy
the IDEA only if it is 'likely to produce progress, not regression or
trivial educational advancement.' "94 The Third Circuit agreed with
the district court's conclusion.95 Applying this standard, the Third
Circuit concluded that J.C.'s day placement was inadequate.6 The
court based its decision largely on expert testimony claiming that
"J.C. was capable of more than the de minimis results he realized
at... [the day placement], but that he needed the intensive, round-
the-clock instruction of a residential school to receive meaningful
benefit from his education. 97 The use of the term "meaningful"98 and
the court's focus on J.C.'s potential appear to extend the IDEA beyond
the Rowley Court's interpretation.99
92. Id. at 392-93. The judge noted J.C.'s occasional improvements in his ability to
"prepare himself to toilet, eat with a spoon, and drink from a cup." Id. at 392.
93. Id. at 393 (discussing the district court hearing and order of residential placement).
94. Id. at 393 (discussing the district court's decision and quoting Board of Educ. v.
Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 991 (3d Cir. 1986)).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 394.
97. Id. at 393 (discussing the testimony of Dr. Dana Henning at the district court hearing).
98. The Rowley Court used the term "meaningful," but equated it to access:
Congress did not impose upon the States any greater substantive educational standard
than would be necessary to make such access meaningful. Indeed, Congress expressly
"recognize[d] that in many instances the process of providing special education and re-
lated services to handicapped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular out-
come." Thus, the intent of the Act was more to open the door of public education to
handicapped children on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of
education once inside.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 11
(cited in note 34)).
99. See Ordover and Boundy, Educational Rights at 18 n.12 (cited in note 50) (citing
Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1473 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding that the child must benefit
meaningfully within his or her potential)); Doe by and through Doe v. Smith, 879 F.2d 1340,
1341 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that the benefit must be "more than de minimis" but need not
"maximize the potential of each handicapped child commensurate with the opportunity provided
nonhandicapped children"); Polk v. Central Susquehanna Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171,
184-85 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a de minimis or trivial benefit is insufficient and determining
that whether a benefit is de minimis must be gauged in reference to the child's potential); Hall
by Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629, 636 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Clearly, Congress did
not intend that a school system could discharge its duty... by providing a program that
produces some minimal academic advancement, no matter how trivial."); Johnson v. Lancaster-
Lebanon Intermediate Unit 13, Lancaster City School Dist., 757 F. Supp. 606, 618 (E.D. Pa.
1991) (holding that an educational program must be sufficient for a student to make
"meaningful educational progress"); Chris D. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 743 F. Supp.
1524, 1531 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (rejecting an implicit school board contention that "a benefit is
conferred anytime a student is not left to vegetate").
730
THE IDEA AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The Ninth Circuit imposed a similar strict benefit standard in
County of San Diego v. California Special Education Hearing Office
("Fo').10 Rosalind Fox, a high-school-aged female, was diagnosed as
being seriously emotionally disturbed ("SED") "on the basis of an
inability to learn which... [could not] be explained by intellectual,
sensory or health factors, and inappropriate types of behaviors or
feelings under normal circumstances." 101 The Ninth Circuit found
that because Rosalind had been diagnosed as SED and was not
merely learning disabled, her goals should include behavioral and
emotional growth, as well as academic benefits.102
Fox, therefore, also imposes a more stringent "benefit" stan-
dard than the one set forth in Rowley, but this time for a child suffer-
ing from a serious emotional disturbance. The Fox court said that the
"correct" standard for measuring educational benefit under the IDEA
is not merely "whether the placement is 'reasonably calculated to
provide the child with educational benefits,' but rather, whether the
child makes progress toward the goals set forth in her IEP."103
Requiring that the IEP help Rosalind improve in controlling her an-
ger, reducing her tendency toward truancy, or diminishing her frus-
tration over academic work, the Ninth Circuit found that an
"appropriate education" includes not only an accumulation of aca-
demic credit but also provision of the guidance needed to succeed in
life. 0 4
The M.C. and Fox decisions' focus on goals beyond mere aca-
demic benefits illustrates Rowley's comparatively narrow scope. Amy
Rowley did not require another type of aid to benefit educationally.
This is apparent in the Supreme Court's conclusion that she was pro-
gressing socially as well as academically, 0 5 and the district court's
finding that Amy was " 'a remarkably well-adjusted child' who inter-
act[ed] and communicat[ed] well with her classmates and ha[d]
'developed an extraordinary rapport' with her teachers."'06
In comparison, the courts in Fox and M.C. were forced to de-
cide cases in which children needed far more than academic train-
100. 93 F.3d 1458 (9th Cir. 1994).
101. Id. at 1463.
102. Id. at 1468.
103. Id. at 1467.
104. Id.
105. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 185.
106. Id. (quoting Rowley, 483 F. Supp. at 531).
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ing.107 Presented with such a situation, the Fox and M.C. courts
shifted their focus from academic progress to social and emotional
fulfillment and the attainment of basic skills necessary to live.108 The
courts' goal appears to be children's self-sufficiency, as evidenced by
their requirements that school systems help children learn to cope
with their disabilities. 10 9 The Supreme Court did not appear to go this
far in Rowley, arguably because it did not have to-Amy was advanc-
ing fine both academically and socially.110 In fact, the Rowley opinion
can be viewed as being consistent with the M.C. and Fox decisions; in
Rowley, the school system was preparing Amy to be self-sufficient.
The only distinguishing factor among these cases is the severity of the
disabilities suffered by the children, not the standard applied by the
courts."'
Many courts, however, continue to view Rowley as a broad-
reaching opinion and apply the Rowley "some educational benefit"
standard in all situations. This broad Rowley interpretation is evi-
dent in the district court's opinion in M.C. and in cases such as Doe by
and through Doe v. Board of Education of State of Connecticut,112
where a district court denied "special education""1 to a child with an
emotional disturbance because of his satisfactory academic perform-
ance.114
107. See notes 90, 101 and accompanying text.
108. See notes 92-95, 105 and accompanying text.
109. See notes 94, 104 and accompanying text.
110. See note 61.
111. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189 (stating that a child's placement should include
"educational instruction specifically designed to meet the unique needs of the handicapped child,
supported by such services as are necessary to permit the child 'to benefit' from the
instruction"). See also California Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d at 1468 (quoting
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189).
112. 753 F. Supp. 65, 65 (D. Conn. 1990).
113. The Code of Federal Regulations defines the term "special education" as "specially
designed instruction, at no cost to the parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with a
disability." 34 C.F.R. § 300.17(a)(1). This "specially designed instruction" is outlined in a child's
IEP, which must be completed before special education or related services can be provided. 34
C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(3)-(4); 34 C.F.R. § 300.342(b)(1).
114. The district court noted that the child's "academic performance (both his grades and
achievement test results) before, during, and after his hospitalization were satisfactory or
above." Doe by and through Doe, 753 F. Supp. at 70. The problem with this reasoning is that
the child will never be able to become fully self-sufficient until he or she learns to manage his or
her disability. The true goal of the IDEA, self-sufficiency, would then be compromised. The
situation in Doe is not unique. If children perform moderately well, they will likely never be
identified as requiring "special education." As Professor Glennon has noted, "the majority of
children with serious emotional disabilities are not even in the special education system."
Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 304 (cited in note 43). She makes this statement in reference to
several reputable studies. Id. at 303-04 (citing Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments
of 1990, H.R. Rep. No. 101-544, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.S.C.A.N.
1723, 1761-62, which states that "children with serious emotional disturbance remain the most
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A broad interpretation of Rowley has a negative impact on
children with disabilities. This impact is illustrated by the incredibly
low identification rates of children with emotional disturbances"15 and
the alarming arrest and incarceration rates of such children."6 The
negative effects are exacerbated by the disturbing fact that the better
a child with mental impairments performs in school, the more limited
his or her chances are of receiving special services or of being classi-
fied as having a disability in the first place. 117 Unfortunately, children
with more severe disabilities receive better care under the IDEA,"5
and children with less severe impairments often receive neither
treatment nor recognition." 9
These negative effects stem from the disturbing fact that the
nation's highest court requires that the public schools provide chil-
dren no more than "some educational benefit." Rowley should there-
fore be attacked on its face, due to its lack of logic and the destructive
force of its language.
3. Problems with Rowley
The Court's analysis in Rowley is flawed for several reasons.
First, its reliance on the term "educational benefits" is misplaced. 20
The Court extracted the term from the IDEA's definition of "related
services": "transportation, and such developmental, corrective, and
underserved population of students with disabilities" and estimates that "only 19% of the
students with serious emotional disturbance are receiving a free appropriate education"). See
also Office of Special Education Programs, U.S. Department of Education, To Assure the Free
Appropriate Public Education of All Children with Disabilities: Fourteenth Annual Report to
Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act A-50,
Appendix A (U.S. G.P.O., 1992) (stating that American schools identify 0.89% of children
between the ages of six and seventeen as seriously emotionally disturbed).
115. See note 46 and accompanying text.
116. See note 234 and accompanying text.
117. See Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 306-07 (cited in note 43) (lamenting the fact that the
majority of IEP's for seriously emotionally disturbed children fail to set behavioral, social, or
emotional goals that provide children with skills to manage the feelings that lead to disruptive
behavior and other problems that prevent them from reaching their potential).
118. See, for example, Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1473 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that
a child must benefit meaningfully within his or her potential but dealing with a child suffering
from "severe developmental delays following an autistic pattern"); Polk, 853 F.2d at 173 (holding
that a de minimis benefit was insufficient and noting that because the child was both mentally
retarded and severely developmentally disabled, the benefits determination must be gauged in
relation to the child's potential).
119. For a brief discussion of the reasons for this failure to identify children with serious
emotional disturbances, see note 46.
120. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207-08.
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other supportive services... as may be required to assist a [child
with disabilities] to benefit from special education."'' This language,
which does not even define FAPE, certainly should not be used to find
that a child with disabilities is entitled to nothing more under the
IDEA than "some educational benefit."122
The Rowley Court also relied heavily on legislative history to
show that the IDEA was created to make public education available to
children with disabilities rather than to guarantee any particular
level of education. 123 The Court emphasized repeated references in
the legislative history to the exclusion of handicapped children from
public education. 124 In presenting what it viewed as unmistakable
proof that the inclusion of children with disabilities constitutes an
"appropriate education,"25 the Court tied separate Senate Report
statements together.126 The Report states that (1) out of eight million
handicapped children, only 3.9 million were being served, and (2) only
3.9 million handicapped children were receiving an appropriate edu-
cation. 27 According to the Court, since the number of children with
disabilities "being served" equaled the number receiving an appropri-
ate education, Congress "unmistakably" intended simply to include
handicapped children in public education. 28
The Court's reliance on such language as conclusive proof is
confusing. If Congress had no greater desire than simply to include
handicapped children in the educational process, then why did it not
require explicitly mere inclusion in the Act? In addition, the repeated
reference to the number of children being "unserved" should not con-
stitute conclusive proof that the statute was enacted simply to include
these children in the educational process. In fact, the language could
support the idea that Congress emphasized the inadequacies of the
current system to garner support for its intent to institute radical
improvements in the education of children suffering from disabili-
ties. 29 Finally, the Court's rationale ignores other equally valid legis-
121. Id. at 189 (emphasis added) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976 ed. & Supp. IV)).
122. As stated by the Court, "Congress did not impose upon the States any greater sub-
stantive educational standard than would be necessary to make such access meaningful." Id. at
192.
123. Id.
124. See generally id. at 191-204 nn.12-26 (discussing the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of the EHA).
125. Id. at 197.
126. Id. at 195 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 8 (cited in note 34)).
127. Id. at 197 (citing S. Rep. No. 94-168 at 8 (cited in note 34)).
128. Id.
129. This explanation seems possible considering Congress's desire to provide these
children with the skills to be self-sufficient. See note 35 and accompanying text.
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lative history. For example, the report indicates that the IDEA does
"guarantee that handicapped children are provided equal educational
opportunity."130 Similarly, Senator Stafford, one of the Act's chief
proponents, declared that "[w]e can all agree that ... education [given
to a child with disabilities] should be equivalent, at least, to the one
those children who are not handicapped receive." 13, Thus, the Court's
determination that the intent was "unmistakable" is questionable.
Regardless of its shortcomings, however, the Rowley decision
serves as the interpretational basis for educational opportunities
under the IDEA.
B. Special Education
The IDEA requires that a state provide a child with disabilities
not only a free appropriate public education,132 but also "special
education and related services designed to meet... [a child's] unique
needs." 13 3 To the general public, the term "special education" carries a
negative implication. The popular notion of special education is a
130. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 214 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing S. Rep. No. 94-
168 at 9 (cited in note 34)). See also 121 Cong. Rec. 19482-19483 (June 18, 1975) (remarks of
Senator Randolph) (discussing the need to provide full educational opportunities to all children
with disabilities); id. at 19504 (remarks of Senator Humphrey) (noting that almost three million
handicapped children, "while in school, received none of the special services that they require in
order to make education a meaningful experience"); id. at 19505 (remarks of Senator Beall)
(stressing the importance of education and expressing a desire to stimulate the potential of
individuals with disabilities); 121 Cong. Rec. 23704 (July 21, 1975) (remarks of Representative
Brademas) (distinguishing between children with disabilities who are receiving an
"inappropriate education" and those who are receiving "no educational services at all"); 121
Cong. Rec. 25538 (July 29, 1975) (remarks of Representative Cornell) (differentiating between
children who were receiving an "inappropriate education" and those who were "deprived of any
educational instruction or training); id. at 25540 (remarks of Representative Grassley) (noting
that "handicapped children have always been slighted on equal educational opportunity"); 121
Cong. Rec. 37025 (Nov. 18, 1975) (remarks of Representative Perkins) (discussing "court
decisions... requiring full educational opportunity" and stating that the federal government
should assume financial responsibility in providing this opportunity); id. at 37030 (remarks of
Representative Mink) (distinguishing between children with disabilities who are "totally
excluded from our educational system" and those children who "do not receive an appropriate
education"); 121 Cong. Rec. 37412 (Nov. 19, 1975) (remarks of Senator Taft) (stating that the
American educational system must "offer the opportunity for the fulfillment of the potential
abilities of all children," especially children with disabilities); id. at 37413 (remarks of Senator
Williams) (recognizing that all children have an "equal right to education" and that, in the past,
children with disabilities were excluded); id. at 37419 (remarks of Senator Cranston) (stating
that the enactment of the EHA would result in the "broadening of equal opportunity for all
handicapped children"); id. at 37419-20 (remarks of Senator Beall) (wishing to ensure "free and
equal educational opportunities for the handicapped").
131. 121 Cong. Rec. 19483 (June 18, 1975) (remarks of Senator Stafford).
132. See note 54 for the definition of FAPE in the Code of Federal Regulations.
133. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c).
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small class segregated from other children led by a teacher trained in
meeting the needs of children with disabilities.13 4 As used in the
IDEA, however, the term is broader, representing "specially designed
instruction... to meet the unique needs of a child with a disabil-
ity.''135 This specially designed instruction is the program set forth in
an IEP.136 Thus, "special education" is simply a general term for the
education provided to a child with disabilities under the IDEA,
encompassing two narrow issues: related services and placement. 13
By analyzing these two issues, this Part will attempt to determine
how school systems provide the "appropriate" education required by
the IDEA and whether the education truly is designed to meet the
unique needs of children with mental impairments.
1. Related Services
As defined in the IDEA, related services consist primarily of
"transportation and such developmental, corrective and other suppor-
tive services.., as may be required to assist a child with a disability
to benefit from special education."13 These services include psycho-
logical services;'39 medical services for diagnostic and evaluation pur-
poses; 40 and counseling services provided by "social workers, psy-
chologists, guidance counselors, or other qualified personnel."141
As discussed earlier, children who suffer from less severe
disabilities are often provided little or nothing in the form of related
services. 42 Some children are therefore often denied much needed
counseling and psychological services. 43 A child suffering from an
emotional disturbance is particularly harmed by this result because
134. See Goldman, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 246-47 (cited in note 36) (discussing the
historical educational treatment of children with disabilities).
135. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(16).
136. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
137. See notes 132-133 and accompanying text.
138. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17).
139. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(a), (b)(8).
140. Id. § 300.16(a), (b)(4).
141. Id. § 300.16(a), (b)(2).
142. See note 46 and accompanying text.
143. In her 1992 article concerning children with emotional disabilities, Theresa Glennon
noted that one study found that 58% of school districts surveyed had failed to provide any
counseling services and that only 10% of emotionally disturbed students in the surveyed school
districts received psychological services from their schools. Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 307-08
(cited in note 43) (citing Jane Knitzer, Zina Steinberg, and Brahm Fleisch, At the Schoolhouse
Door: An Examination of Programs and Policies for Children with Behavioral and Emotional
Problems 14 (Bank Street College of Education, 1990)).
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he or she is often shuttled through the system without ever having
his or her unique, individual needs addressed.1"
Children with emotional disturbances are also often denied
services other than counseling. In Field v. Haddonfield Board of
Education,4 5 for example, the parents of an emotionally disturbed
teenager named Daniel sought an order to require the school district
to pay the costs of a drug treatment program for their son. 46 Daniel
had been expelled from his residential placement for possessing
Valium, and the treatment program was required for readmittance.
47
The assistant director of Daniel's placement facility stated that the
drug possession might have resulted from his emotional distur-
bance. 48  The court nonetheless held that the substance abuse pro-
gram was a medical service for which the plaintiffs-not the school
district-had to pay.4 9
In reaching that decision, the Field court relied on the
Supreme Court's decision in Irving Independent School District v.
Tatro.150 In Tatro, the Court recognized that the IDEA's definition of
"medical services"' 5' stemmed from Congress's desire to limit a
school's obligation to provide expensive services. 52 Tatro set forth a
two-part inquiry.153  To be a valid related service, the service must
assist the disabled child in benefiting from special education154 and
must not be a medical service going beyond diagnosis or evaluation. 155
The Supreme Court found that this standard relieved school districts
from having to pay for services that were strictly medical in nature,
144. Id. at 307 (noting the lack of social work services, individual and family counseling
services, and therapeutic recreation services in many school districts).
145. 769 F. Supp. 1313 (D.N.J. 1991).
146. Id. at 1315.
147. Id. at 1318-19.
148. Id. at 1318.
149. Id. at 1327-29.
150. 468 U.S. 883 (1984).
151. 'Medical services" are "services provided by a licensed physician to determine a child's
medically related disability that results in the child's need for special education and related
services." 34 C.F.R. § 300.16(b)(4).
152. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 892. Congress sought to "spare schools from an obligation to pro-
vide a service that might well prove unduly expensive and beyond the range of their compe-
tence." Id. at 892.
153. Id. at 890.
154. Id. (agreeing with the appellate coures decision in Tatro v. State of Texas, 703 F.2d
823, 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part, 468 U.S. 883, 888 (1983)).
155. Id. at 890-93. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(17) (related services include "medical
services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes
only").
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such as physician and hospital services. 156 Perceiving a substance
abuse program to be purely medical, the Field court denied the par-
ents' request for payment.157
To help a child reach a state of self-sufficiency, the child's IEP
should include counseling, psychological services, and drug treatment
when required. Courts have not required school districts to provide
such treatment, however, for the same reason Rowley did not impose
a potential maximization standard-cost concerns. While the Rowley
Court's cost consideration arguably was legitimate, such cost concerns
should not act as a barrier to prevent children from obtaining basic
skills necessary to achieve self-sufficiency. The Field decision 58
demontrates an overall unwillingness on the part of Congress, the
courts, and the school districts to make all children self-sufficient
whenever possible.
2. Placement
a. Residential Placement
Once a school district or court decides to provide special educa-
tion and related services to a disabled child, it must then determine
where the child should receive the services. The Act requires that
each school district provide a "continuum of alternative placements"
for special instruction. 59
For students with more severe disabilities, such as those clas-
sified as "mentally retarded" or those unable to perform in the regular
school setting, a specialized placement is often required. 160 IDEA
156. Id. at 892. See also Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 693 (3d
Cir. 1981) (stating that the analysis should focus on "whether full-time placement may be
considered necessary for educational purposes, or whether the residential placement is a
response to medical, social or emotional problems that are segregable from the learning
piocess").
157. Field, 769 F. Supp. at 1325-28. But see Ordover and Boundy, Educational Rights at
26-27 (cited in note 50) (stating that if a student is eligible for "special education and related
services under IDEA because of some other condition and has a substance abuse problem that
interferes with his or her ability to benefit from special education," he or she is entitled to
supportive related services aimed at the substance abuse problem).
158. See note 145 and accompanying text.
159. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(a). Possible placements include instruction in regular or special
classes, instruction in special schools, instruction at home, and instruction in hospitals and
institutions. 34 C.F.R. § 300.551(b)(1).
160. See generally David C. Donohue, Note, Clovis Unified School District v. California
Office of Administrative Hearings: Restricting Related Services Under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 8 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol. 407, 411 (1992) (discussing the IDEA
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regulations require placement in a public or private residential pro-
gram at no cost to parents if such placement is necessary "to provide
special education and related services to a child with a disability."1 61
Because of the extraordinary costs, however, school districts fre-
quently attempt to avoid residential placements, even if they are
necessary to accomplish a child's IEP goals.62 Courts faced with a
school district's denial of residential placement typically attempt to
determine whether such placement is required for educational pro-
gress, as opposed to furthering broad mental health goals, and also
whether such placement constitutes a medical service exempt from
the IDEA.163
In Clovis Unified School District v. California Office of
Administrative Hearings,164 the Ninth Circuit found a school district
was not required to pay for the residential placement of a young girl
with a serious emotional disturbance named Michelle Shorey.165
Michelle's adoptive parents placed her in King's View Hospital, an
acute care psychological hospital,66 after she was asked to leave sev-
eral previous placements because of her destructive behavior. 67 The
Shoreys paid for Michelle's placement at King's View until their
medical insurance expired, at which point they sought to have the
requirement that school systems pay for residential placement if the placement is "necessary to
deliver special education to a disabled child").
161. 34 C.F.R. § 300.302.
162. Donohue, 8 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol. at 408 n.15 (cited in note 160) (citing Dixie
Snow Huefner, Special Education Residential Placements Under the Education of All
Handicapped Children Act, 18 J. L. & Educ. 411, 413 (1989) (stating that expenses for residen-
tial placement typically range from $20,000 to $75,000 per year for each student)).
163. Glennon, 60 Tenn. L. Rev. at 339 (cited in note 43). See 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.16(a), (b)(4)
(defining related services and medical services). See also Los Gatos Joint Union High Sch. Dist.
v. Doe, 1984-1985 Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. (LRP Publications) DEC. 556:281, 556:281-82
(N.D. Cal. 1984) (holding that a student suffering from a form of schizophrenia was hospitalized
for primarily medical reasons and that the school district was not liable for the cost of services
provided to the student); Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County v. Tennessee
Dep't of Educ., 771 S.W.2d 427, 428-30 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that placement of a
student with disabilities in a private psychiatric unit was for medical reasons rather than for
educational purposes).
164. 903 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1990).
165. Id. at 644-47. Michelle's disturbance was apparently the "result of an extremely
unstable and chaotic childhood, including neglect and abuse in eight or nine different place-
ments before her ultimate adoption" by the Shoreys. Id. at 639.
166. Id. at 639.
167. Id. The mental health director recommended the move after informing the Shoreys
that Michelle's behavior had deteriorated to the extent that the "staff could no longer control
her." This same destructive behavior had led to Michelle's removal from previous placements.
Id.
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school system cover the costs of that placement.168 The school system
refused, recommending less expensive alternative placements that
Michelle's parents claimed would not have provided the care Michelle
needed. 169 The school district argued that the King's View placement
was a" 'medical service' for which the school district is not financially
liable under the Act, even if it is related to Michelle's education in the
sense that she cannot fully benefit from her education without it."170
The Shoreys, however, argued that this treatment was necessary for
Michelle to gain any benefit from her education.171
Initially, the court explained that it was not bound by Tatro's
two-part test 72 since that case had not dealt with a residential place-
ment. 73 The court rejected as overinclusive the Shoreys' suggestion
that the "only relevant inquiry under the Tatro test is whether the
service provided is supportive of a handicapped child's education." 74
The court explained that, under this view, all medical services could
be considered related services since such services would always help a
child benefit from his or her special education program. 7 5 The Clovis
court instead focused on whether Michelle's placement could be con-
sidered "necessary for educational purposes," or whether the place-
ment was "a [necessary] response to medical, social, or emotional
problems... quite apart from the learning process."176 Applying this
168. Id.
169. Id. The schoors recommendation would have cost approximately $50,000 per year,
while King's View's recommendation would have cost $150,000. Id.
170. Id. at 642 (emphasis added).
171. Id. Although Michelle had previously "performed adequately in the classroom," her
parents argued she was having a very hard time remaining at any placement as a result of her
disruptive behavior. Id. at 639.
172. See notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
173. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., 903 F.2d at 642. In Tatro, the plaintiff was an eight-year-old
girl who suffered from a neurogenic bladder and who required insertion of a catheter into her
urethra to empty her bladder every three or four hours. Tatro, 468 U.S. at 885. The Clovis
Unified School District court did state, however, that the Tatro standards were "helpful." Clovis
Unified School Dist., 903 F.2d at 642.
174. Id. at 643.
175. Id. The court also rejected the line of reasoning used in Vander Malle v. Ambach, 667
F. Supp. 1015, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), that required states to pay for placement costs where
"medical, social or emotional problems that require hospitalization create or are intertwined
with the educational problem." Clovis Unified School Dist., 903 F.2d at 643. See also Papacoda
v. State of Connecticut, 528 F. Supp. 68, 71-72 (D. Conn. 1981) (holding that when the very
purpose of placing a student in special education school was to provide educational services in a
therapeutic environment in which such services would be effective, a state could be required to
pay all reasonable costs of the student's education in school, including room and board, through
the studenes graduation); North v. District of Columbia Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 141
(D.D.C. 1979) (requiring a school system to pay for a residential academic program when a
child's needs for his social, emotional, medical, and educational problems were inextricably
intertwined).
176. Clovis Unified School Dist., 903 F.2d at 643.
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standard, the court concluded that the IDEA did not require the
school district to pay for Michelle's hospitalization.' 77 In essence, the
court denied Michelle the service she needed to benefit from educa-
tion, arguably in the interest of fiscal responsibility.178
The Second Circuit reached a different conclusion in Mrs. B. v.
Milford Board of Education.179 In that case, M.M., a seventeen-year-
old girl, suffered from serious social and emotional disabilities greatly
affecting her ability to learn. 80 M.M. was undergoing psychotherapy
as part of her IEP81 when her evaluator recommended she be placed
in a full-time residential treatment program. 82  The planning and
placement team refused to recommend residential placement despite
M.M.'s increasingly disruptive and aggressive behavior. 183 Instead,
the Department of Child and Youth Services arranged the placement,
and M.M.'s mother was forced to cover all costs deemed non-
educational. 8 4
The Second Circuit found the central question in residential
placement cases to be whether the child "requires the residential
program to receive educational benefit." 8 5 The court in Mrs. B con-
cluded that the school board was wrong to decide only to pay for the
educational component of the placement.86 The court stated "[i]f
institutionalization is required due to a child's emotional problems,
and the child's emotional problems prevent the child from making
meaningful educational progress, the Act requires the state to pay for
177. Id. at 645-47. The court provided as reasons for its conclusions (1) Michelle's acute
psychiatric crisis, which had caused the hospitalization, (2) the hospital program's determina-
tion by a medical team and focus on psychiatric needs, (3) the cost of King's View, and (4) the
hospital's lack of educational services. Id. at 645-46.
178. "Clovis provides a foothold for those who would deny services and opportunities to
disabled individuals, while hiding behind the cause of fiscal responsibility." Donohue, 8 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y at 427 (cited in note 160) (citing Dixie Snow Huefner, Special
Education Residential Placements Under the Education of All Handicapped Children Act, 18 J.
L. & Educ. 411, 436-37 (1989)).
179. 103 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir. 1997).
180. Id. at 1116. M.M.'s problems included hyperactivity, an inability to interact with
others, and lack of self-confidence. Id.
181. She underwent psychotherapy at Milford Mental Health Center, a community-based
therapy center, as a service related to her special education program. Id.
182. Id. at 1117. The evaluator stated that a residential setting was "necessary to 'provide
structured and consistent limits and expectations while providing for the development of age
appropriate social skills."' Id.
183. Id. at 1117 ("In virtually all of her classes, she failed to meet basic academic and be-
havior standards.").
184. Id. at 1117-18
185. Id. at 1122 (citing Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223, 227-28 (1st Cir. 1983)).
186. Id. at 1122.
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the costs of the placement."187 The court held that the state had to
fund the placement program because it was necessary for M.M. to
make educational progress; 188 the fact that M.M. was placed in the
residential program because of her emotional problems was irrele-
vant.
The inconsistent decisions regarding residential placement
indicate that each court decides such cases based on its perception of
how responsible a school system should be when educating children
with disabilities. 189 If the IDEA's goal is to promote a disabled child's
independence and self-sufficiency, 190 the reasonable approach is that
taken by the Second Circuit in Mrs. B. While this approach is more
expensive for school districts, the alternative results in many indi-
viduals' inability to become productive members of society.
b. Mainstreaming
Although some children with severe mental disturbances will
require specialized placement, as discussed above, the IDEA indicates
a preference for instructing "children with disabilities" in regular
classrooms,' 9' a practice known as "mainstreaming" or "inclusion."192
187. Id. This passage echoes Vander Malle, 667 F. Supp. at 1039. See note 175.
188. Mrs. B, 103 F.3d at 1122.
189. See Ordover and Boundy, Educational Rights at 25 (cited in note 50) (referring to
cases in which school systems were held responsible for the entire cost of placement, cases in
which they were held responsible for room and board but not psychotherapy, cases in which
they were not held responsible for room and board or psychotherapy but had to pay tuition, and
cases in which they were not held responsible for any costs at all).
190. See note 35 and accompanying text.
191. Specifically, the IDEA states that "[r]emoval of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability is
such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot
be achieved satisfactorily." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
192. Martha M. McCarthy explains the difference between the two terms in the following
manner:
'Inclusion" is a state-of-the-art term; it is not mentioned in the IDEA. In a fully inclu-
sive model, students with disabilities, no matter how severe, are taught in the regular
education classroom of their home school with their age and grade peers for the full day
with support services provided within that classroom. In short, inclusion means bring-
ing support services to the child rather than moving the child to a segregated setting to
receive special services. Inclusion differs from mainstreaming, which refers to integrat-
ing children with disabilities and nonhandicapped children for a portion of the day,
usually at times when the regular education program does not have to be significantly
modified to accomodate children with disabilities, such as nonacademic periods.
Martha M. McCarthy, Inclusion of Children with Disabilities: Is It Required?, 95 Educ. L. Rep.
at 823, 824 (West 1995) (cited in note 191). Because this Note is only considering this issue as it
relates to the general IDEA framework, it will simply use the term "mainstreaming" to refer to
the general concept of including disabled children in the regular classroom. See Oberti by
Oberti v. Board of Educ. of Borough of Clementon School Dist., 995 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.1 (3d Cir.
1993) ("While 'inclusion' may be a more precise term, we will nonetheless use the term
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When mainstreaming is not possible due to the severity of a child's
handicap, the IDEA requires the school district choose the "least
restrictive" of the remaining placements. 93 The rationale underlying
this requirement echoes the overall goal of self-sufficiency: the
concern that children receive the "most normal [education]
possible... [in the] least restrictive setting.. . [to] adapt to the world
beyond the educational environment and... [to allow] the
nonhandicapped [to] adapt to them."9 4
Unlike residential placement, the focus of mainstreaming is
frequently on children with less severe disabilities. Problems arise
when school districts unnecessarily move these children to a special
education classroom or some other restrictive placement. This prob-
lem occurs quite frequently, due in part to the tension between the
federal law's requirements that a school district provide children with
disabilities education in the "least restrictive environment" while at
the same time providing appropriate, individualized programs.195
In Roncker on Behalf of Roncker v. Walter, 96 the Sixth Circuit
attempted to establish a test for mainstreaming that would
"capture[ ] the policy mandates of individualization, appropriateness,
and least restrictive environment."'197 In Roncker, the parents of a
nine-year-old boy who had been classified as "trainably mentally re-
tarded" sought to include their son in a regular classroom. 98 They
believed that "he would benefit from contact with nonhandicapped
children."99 The school district sought to place the child in a "county
school" that served only mentally retarded children.
The Roncker test analyzes the rationale of selecting a segre-
gated facility and determines whether the same services could feasi-
'mainstreaming' because it is currently the common parlance."). For a general discussion of
mainstreaming, see generally Goldman, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 260-76 (cited in note 36)
(discussing the "least restrictive environment" directive imposed upon the states by the IDEA);
McCarthy, 95 Educ. L. Rep. at 823-24 (cited in this note) (discussing the concept of"inclusion" of
children with disabilities in public school classrooms).
193. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (stating that removal from the regular classroom should
occur "only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes
with the use of supplementary aids cannot be achieved satisfactorily").
194. 120 Cong. Rec. 15272 (May 20, 1974) (remarks of Senator Stafford).
195. McCarthy, 95 Educ. L. Rep. at 824 (cited in note 192) (citing Martha Minow, Learning
to Live with the Dilemma of Difference. Bilingual and Special Education, 48 Law and Contemp.
Problems 157, 157-81 (1985)).
196. 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1986).
197. Goldman, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 267 (cited in note 36).
198. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1060. To qualify as "trainably mentally retarded," a student
must score below 50 on a standardized I.Q. test. Id.
199. Id.
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bly be provided in a less restrictive setting.0 0 The court indicated a
"strong preference in favor of mainstreaming"20 1 yet also recognized
the inevitable truth that some children with mental impairments re-
quire separate facilities.202 The Roncker court listed several consid-
erations to be analyzed in a mainstreaming case, including whether
the child would benefit from the mainstream setting, whether the
child would represent a "disruptive force" presenting a great burden
on the teacher and other students, and the cost of the more restrictive
placement. 03
The first of these considerations focuses on the potential bene-
fit a child with disabilities would receive, mirroring the concerns in
the "appropriate education" and "related service" problems previously
discussed. In Daniel R.R. v. State Board of Education,2 4 the Fifth
Circuit broadened this component of the Roncker test,2 05 stating that
although the child may not understand much of the academic discus-
sion in a regular classroom, he or she "may benefit from nonacademic
experiences in the regular education environment."206 The benefits of
mainstreaming are, however, dependent upon a school district's
200. Id. at 1063.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have also adopted this test. See Devries by
DeBlaay v. Fairfax County School Bd., 882 F.2d 876, 878-79 (4th Cir. 1989) (quoting the Roncker
decision); AW. by and through N.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d 158, 163 (8th Cir.
1987) (stating that the Roncker decision "correctly interpreted the Act's mainstreaming
provisions").
204. 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
205. Under the Daniel R.R. test, a court must first determine "whether education in the
regular classroom, with the use of supplemental aids and services, can be achieved
satisfactorily... [and, if not] whether the school has mainstreamed the child to the maximum
extent appropriate." Id. at 1048.
The Fifth Circuit stated that, in determining whether the first prong of the test has been
met, courts should consider (1) what steps the school has taken to accomodate the child in the
regular classroom, (2) whether the child will receive an educational benefit from regular educa-
tion, (3) the child's overall educational experience in a regular education environment, and (4)
the effect on the regular classroom of the disabled child's presence. Id. at 1048-49. The Third
and Eleventh Circuits have also adopted this test. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1215 (stating that the
Daniel R.R. test is preferable to the Roncker test and adopting the Daniel R.R. test); Greer By
and Through Greer v. Rome City School Dist., 950 F.2d 688, 696 (11th Cir. 1991), opinion with-
drawn and remanded, 956 F.2d 1025, 1027 (11th Cir. 1992), opinion reinstated in part and
amended, 967 F.2d 470, 471 (11th Cir. 1992) (explicitly adopting the Fifth Circuit's test).
206. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048. The court explained that "mainstreaming may have
benefits in and of itself. For example, the language and behavior models available from
nonhandicapped children may be essential or helpful to the handicapped child's
development.... Although a handicapped child may not be able to absorb all of the regular
classroom curriculum, he may benefit from nonacademic experiences in the regular education
environment." Id. at 1047-48. But see Devries, 882 F.2d at 879 (upholding the district court's
finding that the child's disability would make it too difficult to bridge disparity in cognitive
ability with nonhandicapped children).
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supplying the child with the requisite support services. 207 If the school
fails to provide such services, the child's benefits will consist only of
mere presence in the regular class. Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that
courts should conduct a searching inquiry into the existence and suffi-
ciency of supplemental aids and services before analyzing whether the
state has complied with the IDEA. As the Daniel R.R. court stated,
"[t]he Act does not permit states to make mere token gestures to
accommodate handicapped students; its requirement for modifying
and supplementing regular education is broad."20 8
If school districts are inadequate in supplying supplemental
services, 20 9 mainstreaming will inevitably fail to accomplish its in-
tended purpose of providing disabled students the unique aid they
require in a regular class setting. By focusing excessively on cost,210
courts are "provid[ing] a foothold for those who would deny services
and opportunities to disabled individuals, while hiding behind the
cause of fiscal responsibility."211 Because many children with disabili-
ties may never be fully incorporated into an atmosphere similar to
that of regular society, their chances of ever reaching a state of inde-
pendence and self-sufficiency will be severely limited by this stunted
application of the IDEA.
IV. DIscIPLINE AN) THE IDEA
Another consideration in the Roncker test is the potential for
some handicapped children to exhibit "disruptive force." The concern
is that a child's behavior might impose too great a burden on the
classroom teacher and the nonhandicapped students.212  This disci-
pline issue is rapidly becoming the most contested of all IDEA-related
207. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.1 (stating that the purpose of the IDEA is "[tlo insure that all
children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that
includes special education and related services to meet their unique needs") (emphasis added).
Senator Stafford has also made this observation. See note 131 and accompanying text.
208. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1048.
209. See note 46 and accompanying text.
210. The Ninth Circuit provided the third major "mainstreaming" test in Rachel H., 14 F.3d
at 1398, which also included a cost provision. The test is a four-factor test balancing "(1) the
educational benefits of placement full-time in a regular class; (2) the non-academic benefits of
such a placement; (3) the effect [the child] ha[s] on the teacher and children in the regular class;
and (4) the costs of mainstreaming [the child]." Id. at 1404.
211. Donohue, 8 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol. at 427 (cited in note 160). See also note 162.
212. Roncker, 700 F.2d at 1063. See also Rachel H., 14 F.3d at 1404 (citing as a factor in
considering mainstreaming the effect a child with disabilities will have on the regular class);
Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1049.
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controversies. 213 In fact, some commentators have questioned whether
children with disabilities who present discipline problems should even
be included in the educational process at all.214
The substantive and procedural rights the IDEA provides to
eligible students seek to protect children with disabilities from con-
structive exclusion from public schools and to prevent excessive long-
term expulsions and suspensions.2 5 One of the most controversial of
these rights is the "stay-put" provision.21 6 Essentially, this provision
requires that a child remain in his or her present placement while
administrative and court proceedings regarding placement are un-
derway.217 If the child is seeking admission into the public school
system, the stay-put provision requires that the child be placed in a
public school until the proceedings end.218
The Supreme Court's interpretation of this provision in Honig
v. Doe,219 has caused much of the controversy. In Honig, the Court
considered whether an implied "dangerousness" exception existed
that exempted violent children from the protection of the stay-put
clause.220 The Court recognized that the intent behind the provision
was to protect students with disabilities, particularly those with
emotional disturbances, against exclusionary practices.221 In essence,
the Court found that the provision served "to strip schools of the
unilateral authority" they once had to exclude students with disabili-
ties. The Court thus refused to exempt violent children from the stay-
put clause.222
213. Telephone Conversation with Dave Larson, IDEA Adviser to Senator Bill Frist (Jan.
10, 1997) (stating that for seriously emotionally disturbed students, discipline is the "hot-but-
ton" issue).
214. Steven R. Aleman and Nancy Lee Jones, Education and Public Welfare Division of the
Congressional Research Service, Overview of Discipline Procedures for Children with
Disabilities Contained in S. 1578, as Reported by Senate Labor and Human Resource Committee
3 (Apr. 16, 1996) (on file with the Author) (suggesting that if a child is found to be involved with
drugs or weapons and if a child's behavior is determined not to have been a manifestation of his
or her disability, then a school district should be permitted to remove that child from the
educational process completely, denying him FAPE benefits).
215. Ordover and Boundy, Educational Rights at 81 (cited in note 50).
216. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A).
217. "By preserving the status quo ante, the stay-put provision ensures an uninterrupted
continuity of education for a disabled child pending administrative resolution." Light v.
Parkway C-2 School Dist., 41 F.3d 1223, 1227 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2557, 132
L. Ed. 2d 811 (1995).
218. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3)(A).
219. 484 U.S. 305 (1988).
220. Id. at 308.
221. Id. at 324.
222. Id. at 323.
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Although many courts have chosen to focus on the Court's
refusal to recognize a "dangerousness" exception, the Honig Court
actually went to great lengths to provide school districts with tools to
use when dealing with a truly disruptive student. First, the Court's
decision allowed a school to overcome the stay-put provision either by
obtaining the parents' permission or a court injunction.223 Second, the
Honig Court recognized that a school district may employ alternative
methods to discipline disruptive children, including the use of "study
carrels, time-outs, detention, or the restriction of privileges." 2 4
Finally, the Court authorized a ten-day suspension when "a student
poses an immediate threat to the safety of others.225
Despite the limits placed on the provision in Honig, it remains
the source of substantial controversy.226 Prompted by increased school
223. Id. at 326, 328. The Supreme Court specified that to receive an injunction, a school
district must show the child's placement is "substantially likely to result in injury either to
himself, or herself, or to others." Id. at 328.
224. Id. at 325.
225. Id. (quoting Comment following 34 C.F.R. § 300.513). One commentator has suggested
that "[a]ny exclusion from school of more than ten days constitutes a change of placement for
purposes of IDEA, may be accomplished only through the change of placement procedures set
forth in the statute and implementing regulations, and triggers all procedural rights set forth in
20 U.S.C. § 415." Eileen L. Ordover, Disciplinary Exclusion of Students with Disabilities under
Federal Law: An Overview 7 (Center for Law and Education, 1995).
226. See generally Omyra M. Ramsingh, Comment, Disciplining Children with Disabilities
Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 12 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol. 155, 181
(1995) (discussing the need for revision of the stay-put provision). In response to proposed
amendments to the IDEA, there has been a great deal of testimony before Congress on the
issue. Kathleen B. Boundy stated the following about the harsh public reaction to the stay-put
provision:
Contrary to all rhetoric, existing law permits school authorities to remove any
child, including those with disabilities, from his/her current educational placement if
he/she is dangerous to self or others. There have been fewer than a half dozen reported
decisions over a period of 7 years since the Honig decision in which school districts have
actually gone into a court of competent jurisdiction to enjoin a child with disabilities
from attending school because the youngster is allegedly dangerous to self/others. The
truth of the matter is that these court ordered injunctions are infrequently sought be-
cause rare is the case where a school district is able to demonstrate that a student is
dangerous to himself, herself or others that a parent will disagree, file a complaint and
invoke the student's "stay-put" rights. Parents of children with disabilities are no differ-
ent than other parents-they do not want their children, who may be even more vulner-
able, being left in a situation where they... [are] a danger to themselves or others. In
my experience the schools have prevailed in the very few instances when parents re-
fused to concur in a school's proposal to remove a child, who is alleged to be dangerous
to self or others, from his/her current education[al] placement for a period in excess of
ten school days, and where there is a predicate for a finding of dangerousness.
Reauthorization of the IDEA. Discipline Issues, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Labor
and Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1995) (statement of Kathleen B. Boundy,
Center for Law and Education) ("Boundy Testimony"). Sadly, "students with disabilities are
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violence, lawmakers have acted to impose further limits on applica-
tion of the stay-put provision. 27  For example, under the Improving
America's Schools Act of 1994,228 a disabled child's IEP team may
place him or her in an interim alternative educational placement for
up to forty-five days, with or without parental permission, if the child
brings a firearm to school and the child's conduct is determined to be
unrelated to his or her disability.229 Other proposals go even further.
Senator Bill Frist of Tennessee recently recommended that a disabled
child found with drugs or weapons be permanently denied FAPE in
any form or fashion when the child's behavior is not a manifestation
of his or her disability.230
Given the procedural safeguards set forth in Honig, such
proposals and amendments are unnecessary and superfluous. In
addition, a central problem of both the proposed amendment and the
firearm ban is the difficulty of determining whether a particular be-
havior is related to a disability. A severe emotional disturbance or
mental retardation quite possibly manifests itself in all behaviors.231
more likely to be the victims of violence and disruption than its perpetrators." Ramsingh, 12 J.
Contemp. Health L. & Pol. at 181 (cited in this note).
227. One commentator has noted that "as many as fifty young people lose their lives each
year in school related violence." Mansfield, 1 N.Y. City L. Rev. at 203 (cited in note 6) (citing
Charles J. Russo, United States v. Lopez and the Demise of the Gun-Free School Zones Act:
Legislative Over-Reaching or Judicial Nit-Picking?, 99 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 11, 11 (1995) (citing
140 Cong. Rec. S6586 (daily ed. June 8, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Feinstein)). In addition, 11% of
American public school teachers and 23% of American public school students report that they
have been victims of violence in or near their schools. Id. at 204 (citing R. Craig Wood and Mark
D. Chestnutt, Violence in U.S. Schools: The Problems and Some Responses, 97 Educ. L. Rep.
(West) 619, 619 (1995) (citing Louis Harris and Associates, Inc., The Metropolitan Life Survey of
the American Teacher, 1993 at 7 (Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 1993)).
228. Pub. L. 103-382, 108 Stat. 3518, 3518-4032 (1994), codified in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.
229. Pub. L. 103-382, § 314, 108 Stat. 3518, 3936-37 (1994), codified at 20 U.S.C. §
1415(e)(3) and 20 U.S.C. § 8621 (1994 ed.); Improving America's Schools Act of 1994, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 103-761, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 883, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2901, 3214; 140
Cong. Rec. S10017 (daily ed. July 28, 1994) (listing U.S. Department of Education Guidance
Concerning State and Local Responsibilities under the Gun-Free Schools Zone Act of 1994).
230. See S. 1578, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 615A(b)(2)(B) (stating that a child with a disabil-
ity who engages in behavior that violates rules of the local educational agency "shall continue to
receive educational services, consistent with provision of free appropriate public education,
unless... the behavior was not a manifestation of the disability").
231. See Ordover, Disciplinary Exclusion at 2 n.7 (cited in note 225) (citing S-1 v.
Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346-47 (5th Cir. 1981), disapproved by Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317
(1988), and citing School Bd. of Prince William County, Virginia v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1216
(4th Cir. 1985)). In Turlington, the Fifth Circuit stated that knowledge of the difference
between right and wrong does not establish that misconduct is or is not a manifestation of a
handicap. S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342, 346 (5th Cir. 1981), disapproved by Honig v. Doe, 484
U.S. 305, 317 (1988). For example, "a child with low intellectual functioning... [might] respond
to stress or respond to a threat in the only way that they feel adequate," which may be "verbal
aggressive behavior." Id. at 346-47. Also, an "orthopedically disabled child might behave
aggressively towards other children, provoking fights, as a way of dealing with stress and
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Any argument that violent behavior is unrelated to a disability would
be questionable at best.
The new provisions and Senator Frist's proposal also present
other serious problems. First, requiring a nexus between a disability
and violent behavior to receive the benefits of the stay-put provision
undermines the explicit non-exclusion mandates underlying the
passage of the IDEA.232 Second, the nexus requirement will dispar-
ately affect children from lower-income families, already unable to
obtain the independent evaluations, expensive psychiatric testing,
and expert witness fees required to succeed in challenging findings by
school districts. 33
Finally, such provisions and proposals are shortsighted be-
cause children with mental impairments have significantly lower
rates of school completion, graduation, continuing education, and em-
ployment, and a significantly higher rate of involvement with the
juvenile and adult correctional systems.234 An inability to control one's
own behavior is a roadblock to the goal of self-sufficiency. As the
Sixth Circuit recently stated, "[w]hen school systems fail to accommo-
date a disabled student[s] behavioral problems, these problems may
be attributed to the school system's failure to comply with the re-
feelings of physical vulnerability." Id. In Malone, the Fourth Circuit found that students with
specific learning disabilities acted as a go-betweens in drug deals for fellow students. School
Bd. of Prince William County, Virginia v. Malone, 762 F.2d 1210, 1216 (4th Cir. 1996). The
court concluded that the district court had properly reasoned that "[a] direct result of... [the
student's] learning disability is a loss of self image, an awareness of lack of peer approval
occasioned by ridicule or teasing from his chronological age group .... These emotional
disturbances make him particularly susceptible to peer pressure. Under these circumstances he
leaps at a chance for peer approval." Id. at 1216.
232. Boundy Testimony at 102 (cited in note 226).
233. Id.
234. Id. Ms. Boundy provided the following statistics:
[Fifty percent] ... of students identified as seriously emotionally disturbed drop out of
school before they graduate, and 20% are arrested at least once before leaving school,
35% within a few years of leaving school. Generally, about 38% of all students with dis-
abilities drop out of school before graduation, and dropped out with fewer than 10 cred-
its. Students with disabilities from low-income families and from minority groups are at
greater risk of dropping out of school, and in addition to students with serious emotional
disturbances, students with mental retardation, learning disabilities, other health im-
pairments, or speech impairments drop out in significant numbers (23-30%). Students
with disabilities compared to students without disabilities have a significantly greater
likelihood of being on welfare... [and of] having difficulty finding and maintaining a
job.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (citing Office of Special Education Programs, U.S. Department of
Education, To Assure the Free Appropriate Public Education of All Children with Disabilities:
Sixteenth Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act 97-99, 109-10 (U.S. G.P.O., 1994)).
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quirements of the IDEA."235 The Sixth Circuit's statement is consis-
tent with the IDEA proviAion that handicapped children should be
removed from a regular classroom only when education cannot be
satisfactorily achieved in that classroom even with the use of supple-
mentary aids and services. 236 Under the IDEA, a child with disabili-
ties is entitled to a "free appropriate public education which empha-
sizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs."237 Any inability to control behavior that affects a
child's ability to gain meaningful benefit from education should be
viewed as a unique need addressed in his or her IEP.238 A failure to
do so should result in nothing short of a direct violation of IDEA re-
quirements.23 9
When considering proposals such as Senator Frist's, Congress
should examine exactly what is being accomplished by excluding chil-
dren with mental impairments and problems from schools. Certainly,
such proposals do not further school safety any more than does the
availability of court injunctions and short-term suspensions. Nor will
they deter future violent behavior because children with disabilities
will probably not understand the causal relationship between their
behavior and the consequences. Such proposals do nothing more than
undermine the IDEA's intent by decreasing self-sufficiency and
encouraging dependence. These results would increase the chance
that children with disabilities would end up either on welfare or in
prison.240 Needless to say, neither of these results is the end product
of a successful education system.
235. Morgan v. Chris L., No. 94-6561, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1041, at *14-15 (6th Cir. Jan.
21, 1997) (citing Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982)). The Kaelin opinion recognized
the connection between an inappropriate IEP and a student's disciplinary difficulties. Kaelin v.
Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595, 601 (6th Cir. 1982).
236. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B).
237. Id. § 1400(c).
238. See Howard S. v. Friendswood Indep. School Dist., 454 F. Supp. 634, 640 (S.D. Tex.
1978) (finding that the plaintiff, whom school officials sought to expel following a suicide
attempt and hospitalization, "was not afforded a free, appropriate public education during the
period from the time he enrolled in high school until December of 1976, [which] was... a
contributing and proximate cause of his emotional difficulties and emotional disturbance").
239. See Chris D. v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 753 F. Supp. 922, 932-33 (M.D. Ala.
1990) (holding that the school failed to provide appropriate educational program to an
emotionally disturbed student; rather than employing strategies to teach the student
appropriate behavior with the goal of ultimately returning him to the regular education setting,
the IEP merely described classroom rules and punishments and rewards for breaking or
following them).
240. See note 234.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed the benefit the IDEA guarantees a
wide range of children, from those suffering from mental retardation
to those with severe emotional disturbances. Some children falling
within IDEA guidelines even have additional problems such as drug
addiction and an inability to control their behavior. In passing the
IDEA, Congress was attempting to provide benefits to every child
suffering from a disability. It "believed that money spent on educat-
ing children with disabilities to be self-sufficient adult members of
society would be more humane, and less expensive to society than
maintaining such persons as welfare dependents or in institutions."241
Each child requires unique care to reach a state of self-sufficiency.
Unfortunately, society has demonstrated a general lack of commit-
ment to provide funding and services necessary to address these
unique needs.242 The focus of our concern and resources must shift
toward providing children with mental impairments the skills they
need to reach a state of independence. This attention would benefit
241. Melvin, 44 DePaul L. Rev. at 618 (cited in note 36). See also John Harrison, Self-
Sufficiency Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: A Suggested Judicial
Approach, 1981 Duke L. J. 516, 521-28 (emphasizing Congress's perception that children with
disabilities should receive that level of educational opportunity reasonably necessary to achieve
a maximum level of self-sufficiency so as not to become a burden to society or the child's family,
and to avoid the indignity of institutionalization).
242. See Goldman, 20 U. Dayton L. Rev. at 244 n.11 (cited in note 36) ("Congress author-
ized the federal share of costs for special education services to increase to a cap of 40% by 1981,
but appropriations have never exceeded 12% of the excess costs associated with special serv-
ices.") (citing Martha M. McCarthy, Can Costs Be Considered in Special Education Placements?,
22 J. L. & Educ. 265, 266 (1993)). As of 1984-85, the federal government was paying 8.2% of the
cost of special education funding, while states paid 56.7% and local districts paid the remaining
35.1%. Samuel Dempsey and Douglas Fuchs, "Flat" Versus 'Weighted" Reimbursement
Formulas: A Longitudinal Analysis of Statewide Special Education Funding Practices, 59
Exceptional Children 433, 433 (1993).
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not only the children themselves, but also society as a whole. Let us
truly unite in the education of our children and work together in
preparing this nation for its future.
Robert Caperton Hannon*
* This Note is dedicated to Sandra C. Dobson, who currently teaches Language Arts and
manages the Gifted and Talented Program at Barnard Elementary School in Washington, D.C.
By witnessing her preparation, patience, and persistence, I came to understand that all children
are blessed with the power to learn. It is the school, the teacher, and the community that must
find a way to make that power an active, thriving force in a child's life. These are the beliefs
with which Sandy attacks every day and in every lesson. God bless her and her dedication.
In addition, I would like to thank Professor Alex Hurder, Shannon Evans, Scott Lynn,
Courtney Persons, Tamsen Love, and Martha Waggoner without whose help this Note would
not have come to fruition.
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